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The Other Re-engineering of Engineering Education, 1900-1965, by
B. E. Seely, Journal of Engineering Education, ASEE, July
1999, pp. 285-294. [113 references]
Summarized by J. T. P. Yao, 7/10/00
"Many engineering colleges in the 1990s are busy revising the style
and substance of engineering curricula to provide increased attention
to design.
This paper examines how and why this earlier 're-engineering'
of engineering education came to pass.
The paper next discusses
the efforts of leaders such as Solomon Cady Hollister and Eric Walker
to introduce changes after 1945, and concludes by noting how their
initial visions of curricula based on engineering science were altered
during implementation."
"Recent efforts to re-emphasize design in engineering schools and
develop a better balance with engineering science actually fit into
a history that extends further into the past than two decades.
In fact, the changes being proposed in the 1990s seek to undo an
earlier 're-engineering' of engineering education in the United
States, an effort that dominated the first half of this century.
It was only after World War II that American engineering
colleges completely embraced engineering science as the foundation
of engineering education.
"
"Moreover, research was not a normal activity for most engineering
faculty, thanks to crushing teaching loads. Only after 1900 did
a few engineering schools begin to expect faculty to conduct research
as part of their professional lives. And that research almost always
was highly practical.
Industrial funds were rarely available
before 1920, and then at only a few schools. But when industrial
sponsors supported research, they expected practical results, not
theoretical studies."
"After 1920, however, firm foundations for real change began to
be laid in American engineering schools by a number of European
engineers.
In fact, these Europeans brought engineering science
to the U.S. They approached engineering with a belief in the utility
of applied mathematics and greater interest in developing theoretical
bases for engineering.
As a result, the Europeans approached
engineering problems as general cases in physics or exercises in
applied mathematics. Yet, these Europeans were not mere theoreticians,
for they shared the engineer's commitment to solving real-world
problems. All of them spent time as consultants.
Only after
World War II did their approach become widely accepted."
"
Within a decade, the entire educational enterprise had
been transformed. First, and avalanche of federal money, primarily
from the military and the Atomic Energy Commission, displaced the
smaller industrial research projects that had been conducted by
a few engineering colleges before 1940.
After 1945, however,
federal grants worth hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars
a year supported not just researchers but entire graduate programs
with marvelous new facilities and expensive equipment.
Engineering
scientists were much better equipped to conduct such projects than
many practically-trained engineers and received priority in funding.
The military embarked upon a massive permanent research program
to be prepared for the next war, and engineering science assumed
much greater importance in American engineering colleges.
American engineers schooled in the European approach now began to
alter undergraduate curricula and expectations about graduate work.
First, they made more time for science and math courses.
Graduate work in engineering grew steadily in importance during
the 1950s, with the strongest emphasis placed on engineering science.
These changes in research and curriculum moved engineering
science into the mainstream of American engineering education.
"
"This effort to link engineering science and to practice in industry
simply continued the long-standing assumption that ties between
industry and American engineering schools were natural.
Indications
of divergence became apparent in the preparation of a study of engineering
education by the American Society for Engineering Education (ASEE)
in the early 1950s. Hollister, ASEE president in 1951-52, set the
study in motion after the Engineers' Council for Professional Development
(forerunner to the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology),
worried that engineering curricula were not 'breaching the gap between
the fundamental sciences and engineering instruction.' The first
draft of the so-called Grinter Report stressed the need for more
science in engineering curricula and then, more controversially,
proposed two tiers of engineering instruction.
Readers of
the report disagreed sharply, however, and the final version of
the Grinter Report settled for a strong endorsement of the need
for more science in engineering schools. Why the protest? The key,
again, was military research finding. What engineering school would
voluntarily cut itself off from military research dollars, the key
to building academic engineering programs?
"
"By the late 1950s, engineering deans had learned this equation
for growth. Schools seeking to grow had to develop graduate programs
to support fundamental research programs, and emphasize engineering
science. But the goal was not to serve industry, rather to attract
federal research funds. About 70 percent of all research money came
from the federal government through the 1950s, making this source
far more important - and lucrative - than corporate funding.
"
"In 1965, Eric Walker was ASEE president and used the office as
an opportunity to launch another study of engineering education.
This report found that engineering education had been transformed
since 1945.
And nearly every engineering school with ambitious
leaders had developed a professional-scientific curriculum, not
a professional-general program. Thus engineering science came to
dominate American engineering schools."
"
Many writers complained that engineering journals contained
little material of practical use, and some engineers even dropped
their professional memberships. Most intriguingly, educators and
reformers such as Eric Walker and Solomon Hollister were not pleased
about how things turned out.
In his autobiography, Walker
criticized European-born Harvard professors of the 1930s because
'their sacred cow was 'engineering science' - meaning theoretical
analysis regardless of whether it could be applied.
' By the
1970s, Walker felt this description fit too many engineering faculty.
Frustrated at the 'overemphasis on science for its own sake' among
engineering educators, Walker argued that 'The danger for engineers
is that they can become too enamored of research for its
own sake. A good engineer
must strike a balance between knowing
and doing.'"
"
To many practicing engineers and engineering faculty alike,
parts of this history are quite familiar, because they lived through
it.
It created a gulf between engineering schools and industrial
practice, and perhaps even an imbalance of theory and practice in
the colleges.
Almost forty years after Hollister, Walker,
and others first proposed the idea, engineering educators are again
attempting to harness more effectively engineering science to questions
of practice and the problems of industry.
The world of engineering
and technology is very different in 1997, to be sure. But maybe
the result will be a style of engineering education that more closely
resembles what Hollister, Walker, and his European colleagues envisioned
after World War II, a system that balances theory and practice."
[Readers who are interested in this article are encouraged to
read the original paper in its entirety. Other summary notes on
faculty reward systems are available on the Internet at http://lohman.tamu.edu
under the heading "Summaries of Papers ..."]
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